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TENDER OFFER DEFENSES: THE NEED FOR
NATIONAL GUIDELINES IN LIGHT OF MOBIL
Corporate takeovers through the use of tender offers have in-
creased significantly in the recent past. The Williams Act was en-
acted in 1967 to protect shareholders who were faced with these
tender offers. In particular, the Act protects shareholders by
prohibiting the tender offeror or the tender offeree from engaging
in manipulative acts. The Act does not, however, protect share-
holders from the inherent conflict of interest directors are faced
with when confronted with a hostile tender offer. The Sixth Cir-
cuit appears to have tried to relieve this conflict, but in so doing
misapplied the term "manipulation" as it is used in the Act. This
Comment examines the Williams Act and the meaning of manipu-
lation, and asserts that the Sixth Circuit erred in finding manipu-
lation absent the necessary element of intent. The Comment con-
cludes that to reduce the potential damage to shareholders
resulting from a director's conflict of interest, new federal legisla-
tion should be enacted requiring disclosure and substantiation of
the validity of a directors reasons for fighting a tender offer.
INTRODUCTION
The takeover of one corporation by another is an increasing phe-
nomenon in today's business world. One method of takeover fre-
quently used is the tender offer.1 The tender offeree (target corpora-
tion) may consider the tender offeror (bidder corporation) to be
either friendly or hostile. If the target considers the bidder to be
hostile, a number of defenses to the tender offer may be employed.2
Any defense used by the target must not violate section 14(e) of the
1. Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251 (1973); see also ARANOW, EINHORN
& BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL, 1 (1977).
2. Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics-Federal Regulation of Management's
Prerogative, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 633, 634 n.5 (1982).
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Williams Act,3 part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which
states in pertinent part "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . to
engage in any. . manipulative acts or practices, in connection with
any tender offer. .. .
Manipulative acts under section 14(e) were found to exist in Mo-
bil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.5 The Mobil court held that the stock
option and asset option given by Marathon to U.S. Steel were ma-
nipulative within the meaning of section 14(e). The decision reflects
the conflicts courts face when dealing with defenses to hostile tender
offers: Should the target corporation be able to undertake any tender
offer defenses6 so long as there is full disclosure or should the share-
holders have an absolute right to consider all tender offers regardless
of target management's desire to defend against such an offer?7 Ma-
nipulation under section 14(e) requires an element of intent to
deceive or defraud allowing any tender offer defense so long as full
disclosure occurs and intent is absent.8 The Mobil decision finds ma-
nipulation regardless of wrongful intent and effectively gives share-
holders an absolute right to consider all tender offers.
Section 14(e) does not effectively combat certain inherent
problems in defenses to hostile tender offers.9 For example, 14(e)
does not address the inherent conflict of interest a target director
faces when confronted with a hostile tender offer. The conflict arises
because the director must decide whether to act in his own self inter-
est and insure his job and power within the corporation or to act in
the shareholders' best interests and objectively evaluate the tender
offer. On the other hand, the Mobil decision tortures the accepted
interpretation of the term manipulation in an effort to combat these
potential conflicts. Regardless of section 14(e)'s failure to combat
these problems, this Comment will contend the Mobil court should
not have acted in a legislative manner and, effectively rewritting sec-
tion 14(e) and countered the essence of the Williams Act. This Com-
ment will contend that rather than judicial action an amendment to
the Williams Act, addressing the conflict of interest problem, should
be passed by Congress.
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-
(e), n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1982).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
5. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
6. Panter, Matyas & Panter, Why Shareholders Have the Right to Accept Tender
Offers, 61 Cm. BAR REc. 368 (May/June 1980).
7. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
8. Id. Even with full disclosure, however, the intent needed for manipulation may
be present. Additionally, intent does not necessarily follow from non-disclosure; however,
non-disclosure is usually present when the intent to deceive is found. Id.
9. The inherent problem discussed in this Comment is the conflict of interest in-
volved when a target defends against what the target considers a hostile tender offer. See
infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
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This Comment will discuss the purpose behind the Williams Act
in light of judicial decisions and legislative history. Next, the Com-
ment will analyze the term manipulation under section 14(e) as de-
fined by case law. Further, the surprise holding in Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co. will be analyzed, with the assertion that such an
interpretation of "manipulation" goes beyond the Supreme Court's
interpretation of manipulation and the Williams Act. Finally, the
Comment will assert that present state and federal laws are inade-
quate to combat the inherent conflict of interest involved in hostile
tender offers; therefore, federal legislation is required to address the
problem.
THE WILLIAMS ACT
The Williams Act10 was enacted in 1967 to provide greater protec-
tion to shareholders confronted with tender offers. The Act protects
shareholders by requiring full disclosure of the identity, background,
and plans of the tender offeror (bidder)."' Legislative history and the
actual wording of the Act demonstrate an intent to provide full dis-
closure to shareholders. 2 Prior to the Act, bidders could operate
under a veil of secrecy, leaving unsuspecting shareholders ignorant of
the bidder's identity, source of funds, or plans (once the takeover
was complete).
The legislative history also reveals an intent to maintain a neutral
position between the target and the bidder.1 3 Senator Harrison A.
Williams, Jr., author of the Act, emphasized he had "taken extreme
care with this legislation to balance the scales equally to protect the
legitimate interests of the corporation, management, and sharehold-
ers without unduly impeding cash takeover bids." 4 The intent of
neutrality would appear to prohibit an interpretation of the Act
which would either hinder a target in legitimately defending against
a takeover, or hinder a bidder by imposing undue burdens.
Judicial interpretation of the Williams Act fully recognizes the
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(a)-(e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§
78m(d)-(3), n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1982).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d(1)
(1982).
12. "The purpose of this bill is to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of
stockholders. .. " 113 CONG. REc. 854-55 (1967) (statement of Senator Harrison A.
Williams, Jr.).
13. Id. at 854.
14. Id. See also Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S.Ct. 2629, 2636 (1982).
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purpose of the Act is to protect shareholders. 15 The goal of neutrality
between the bidder and target, on the other hand, is not as well set-
tled. In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., the Supreme Court recog-
nized that neutrality was a goal of the Williams Act., One year
later, in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, the Court ruled that share-
holder protection was the sole purpose of the Williams Act and neu-
trality was but one characteristic of that overall purpose:1
The most recent Supreme Court decision interpreting the Wil-
liams Act revitalizes the Rondeau1 8 holding. Edgar v. Mite states
shareholder protection and neutrality between the bidder and target
are within the goals of the Williams Act.19 The Supreme Court, in
Edgar, recognized a second purpose of the Act-to maintain an
evenhanded or neutral position when applying the regulations of the
Act to a bidder or target (to the extent that such evenhandedness
furthers the protection of the shareholders).20
By maintaining an evenhanded role, the Act allows both the bid-
der and target to present arguments to the shareholder as to why the
tender offer is beneficial or detrimental. Accordingly, the shareholder
will be able to make an informed decision and the Act will have
performed its twofold function of protecting the shareholder and
maintaining a neutral role. 21 Consequently, Edgar rather than Piper
15. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975); Piper v. Chris-
Craft Industries, 430 U.S. 1, 16 (1977); Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S.Ct. 2629 (1982).
16. 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).
17. Piper involved an unsuccessful bidder attempting to sue a competing bidder for
damages. The Court held that the unsuccessful bidder did not have standing to sue in its
capacity as a bidder. The Piper Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the Williams
Act's purpose of neutrality must necessarily imply a cause of action for damages. The
Court stated that because the purpose of the Act is to protect an express class of share-
holders (target shareholders), a cause of action would lie only if it benefitted or protected
this specific class. The plaintiff was in this specific class of shareholders. The Court,
nevertheless, emphasized that when the bidder sues in its capacity as a defeated bidder
and not in the capacity of an injured shareholder (within the class to be protected), the
benefit of the Act will not inure. See 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).
18. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982), "Congress sought to protect
the investor not only by furnishing him with the necessary information but also by with-
holding from management or bidder any undue advantage that could frustrate the exer-
cise of an informed choice." Id. at 2636.
19. Id. at 2629.
20. Id. at 2636.
21. Whether the Act's sole purpose is to protect shareholders, with neutrality being
a mere characteristic, or whether the Act's purpose is twofold (protecting shareholders
and maintaining a neutral position between bidder and target) appears largely a seman-
tic argument. Legislative history of the Act expressly emphasizes both full disclosure and
neutrality. 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967). Arguments expressing the purposes as divergent
and independent appear to be based on a misreading of the legislative history. The pro-
tection of the shareholder is accomplished by allowing the shareholder to examine and
weigh information received from both the target and the bidder. The neutral aspect of
the Act provides "the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their
case." Id. at 855. The legislative history expresses concern to "avoid tipping the balance
of regulatory burden in favor of management or in favor of the offeror." Id. at 854. The
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appears to better coincide with the objectives noted in the legislative
history of the Act.
Section 14(e) Manipulation
Section 14(e),22 a part of the Williams Act, is intended to protect
shareholders and to insure neutrality between the bidder and target
corporations. Section 14(e) helps to achieve these goals by making it
unlawful "for any person to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices in connection with any tender
offer. . .
The term "manipulative" has come under particular scrutiny in
recent years.2' The Williams Act fails to define the term. However,
courts have derived the meaning of manipulation under section 14(e)
from cases interpreting the term "manipulation" under section 10(b)
of the Act.25 Section 10(b) and section 14(e) are both sections of
federal securities laws with remarkably similar wording26 - each
legislative history seems to state explicitly that evenhandedness and shareholder protec-
tion are basically intertwined. The greatest degree of shareholder protection is achieved
when neutrality is pursued and the greatest degree of neutrality is achieved when share-
holder protection is pursued--each objective relying on the other. Thus, both shareholder
protection and neutrality between the target and bidder are integral parts of the Wil-
liams Act and should not be seen as divergent. Senator Williams himself asserted this
upon the Act's introduction. Id. at 854.
22. Section 14(e) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not mislead-
ing, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices,
in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any
solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer,
request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection,
by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to pre-
vent such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (1983); Pacific Re-
alty Trust v. APC Investments, Inc., 685 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1982).
25. For examples of courts defining "manipulation" under section 10(b) of the
Williams Act, see Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 282 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. den., 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759, 764 (8th Cir.
1978).
26. Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
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contains the term "manipulation."
Manipulation, when used in federal securities laws, is a "term of
art" and should retain the same meaning no matter where it is used
in federal securities laws. Thus, Supreme Court interpretations of
the term manipulation as it is used within section 10(b) should be
equally applicable to the term manipulation when it is used in sec-
tion 14(e).2
The Supreme Court has confronted the term "manipulation"
under a section 10(b) claim. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder8 involved
a claim alleging that an accounting firm's failure to conduct a pru-
dent audit of a brokerage firm, thereby aiding and abetting a fraud-
ulent action committed by the brokerage firm's president, amounted
to a violation of section 10(b) of the securities laws. The Hochfelder
Court found no such violation of section 10(b) for deceit, manipula-
tion, or fraud absent the necessary element of scienter2 9 The Court
stated manipulation is considered a "term of art" when used in con-
nection with securities transactions, and is used in the Williams Act
section 14(e) to prohibit transactions or practices which are intended
to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.30
A second case involving manipulation under section 10(b) is Santa
Fe Industries v. Green.31 The Santa Fe Court reemphasized that the
scienter element is needed when asserting a claim of "manipulation"
under securities laws. 2 Moreover, the Santa Fe Court stated that
"nondisclosure is usually essential to the success of a manipulative
scheme. '3 3 Finally, the Santa Fe Court held that an action involving
a breach of a fiduciary duty did not state a claim for manipulation
under section 10(b), finding that remedies under state laws offered
protection from such a breach.3
Presently, the Supreme Court has analyzed the term manipula-
tion, when dealing with securities laws, only in the context of section
10(b). Nonetheless, because the wording of section 10(b) and section
14(e) is so similar, the analysis used for the term manipulation
under section 10(b) should also be applicable to section 14(e).35 Yet,
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
27. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
28. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
29. Id. at 199.
30. Id.; see also Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
31. 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
32. Id. at 477.
33. Id.; but see Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 376 (6th Cir.
1981). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have used this statement to elimi-
nate the element of scienter in determining a claim of manipulation under section 14(e).
34. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478.
35. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (courts holding section 10(b) and
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one court has deviated from such analysis when applying the term
manipulation in section 14(e). 8 In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil
Co., the court found the transactions between U.S. Steel and Mara-
thon Oil constituted manipulative devices despite the absence of sci-
enter and the presence of full disclosure.
3 7
MOBIL CORP. V. MARATHON OIL CO.
On October 30, 1981, Mobil Corporation initiated a tender offer
with the intent of purchasing up to 40 million shares of common
stock in Marathon Oil Co. for $85 per share. The offer was condi-
tioned upon receipt of just over half (at least 30 million) of the out-
standing shares. Mobil also announced its intention to obtain the
balance of Marathon by merger after the purchase of those shares.
Mobil's plans caused great concern to the directors of Marathon
and resulted in an emergency board meeting.38 The meeting
culminated in a decision by the board to seek a favorable bidder or
"white knight."39 On November 18, 1981, after negotiations with
several companies, Marathon directors voted to recommend to the
shareholders a proposal by U.S. Steel.40
The U.S. Steel proposal can be divided into two parts. First, U.S.
Steel offered to purchase 30 million Marathon shares at $125 per
share. The offer, if successful, would be followed by a merger of
Marathon with one of U.S. Steel's subsidiary corporations (U.S.S.
Corp.).41 Second, before U.S. Steel would agree to tender such an
offer, Marathon would have to (a) grant an irrevocable option to
purchase 10 million authorized but unissued Marathon shares at $90
per share, and (b) grant an option to purchase Marathon's interest
in oil and mineral rights in the Yates Field (considered to be Mara-
thon's most valuable asset or "crown jewel") for $2.8 billion to be
exercised only if U.S. Steel's tender offer failed and a third party
14(e) coextensive).
36. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
37. Id.
38. The directors did not feel Mobil's original offer was a fair price. Id. at 367; see
also Mobil v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,375 at 92,265 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 1981).
39. "White knight" is used to describe a company which the target feels is a more
attractive candidate for merger.
40. Mobil v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 98,375 at 92,268 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 1981), rev'd, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir.
1981).
41. Id. U.S. Steel and Marathon entered into a formal merger agreement on that
same day, November 18, 1981. Id. at 92,268-69.
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was successful in gaining control over Marathon. 2 The Marathon
board of directors accepted this proposal in its entirety and unani-
mously voted to recommend the proposal to its shareholders .4
Mobil commenced suit in the United States District Court re-
questing injunctions against the exercise of the two options between
U.S. Steel and Marathon, claiming the options violated section
14(e). The district court denied Mobil's request. 4 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 5
The Sixth Circuit held the options between U.S. Steel and Mara-
thon represented "manipulative devices" within the meaning of sec-
tion 14(e) of the Williams Act.4 1 Without disturbing the district
court's findings that Marathon directors had not breached any
fiduciary duty, the Sixth Circuit defined manipulation as any trans-
action which "affect[s] the market for, or price of, securities by arti-
ficial means, i.e., means unrelated to the natural forces of supply and
demand. 1 7 By defining manipulation in these terms, the Sixth Cir-
cuit ignored the prior Supreme Court definition of manipulation
which requires some element of scienter.48 The court quoted directly
from the two Supreme Court decisions defining manipulation under
securities laws,' 9 yet focused solely on the element of "artificially
affecting market activity. '5 The requirement of intent is generally
disregarded by the Mobil court. The court found that devices which
artificially affect the market are enough to constitute manipulation,
even absent intent.
The court held that the two options between Marathon and U.S.
Steel artificially affected market activity by creating an artificial
price ceiling in the tender offer market for Marathon common
shares.5 1 The court analyzed each option separately to determine
whether section 14(e) had been violated.
The Mobil court first discussed the legality of the Yates Field op-
tion. The court recognized the Yates Field asset, labelled the "crown
42. Id. at 92,268.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 92,286. The district court denied the injunction because of Mobil's fail-
ure to demonstrate a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claim
that U.S. Steel and Marathon had violated section 14(e) of the Williams Act. rd.
45. Mobil v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
46. Id. at 377; see supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
47. 669 F.2d at 374.
48. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
49. "flIntentional or willful misconduct designed to deceive or defraud investors
by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities." Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (emphasis added).
"The term refers generally to practices . . . that are intended to mislead investors by
artificially affecting market activity." Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476
(1977) (emphasis added). Cited in Mobil, 669 F.2d at 374.
50. 669 F.2d at 374.
51. Id. at 375.
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jewel" of Marathon, was of enormous value to potential buyers of
the company and, without such an asset, Marathon's attractiveness
for takeover diminished greatly. 52 U.S. Steel was effectively deter-
ring other takeover bids by requiring Marathon to grant the option
to purchase Marathon's interest in Yates Field if a third party
gained control of Marathon. As a result, U.S. Steel's bid of $125 per
share amounted to an artificial ceiling on the amount Marathon
shareholders could expect to receive for their shares.53 Consequently,
the court held the Yates Field option to be manipulative within the
meaning of section 14(e).
The stock option was also held to be manipulative within the
meaning of section 14(e). The stock option gave U.S. Steel the op-
portunity to purchase 10 million authorized but unissued Marathon
shares at $90 per share, resulting in a decided advantage over other
bidders. The court stated that, if the options were exercised, any
competing bidder seeking 40 million Marathon shares would have to
pay an additional 1.1 to 1.2 billion dollars just to match U.S. Steel's
offer.54 In other words, any competing tender offeror would have to
pay a substantial amount over that which U.S. Steel would have to
pay for the same number of shares, resulting in a decided advantage
for U.S. Steel.55 The court found that the stock option had the po-
tential of "artificially and significantly" deterring other possible
tender offerors from bidding.58
Mobil is a drastic deviation from the recognized use and interpre-
tation of the term manipulation.57 The Supreme Court has held the
term manipulation, when used with securities transactions, involves
(1) an element of artificially affecting market activity,58 and (2) an
express element of scienter-the intent to mislead59 or deceive" in-
vestors. The Mobil court emphasized that practices which artificially
affect market activity are manipulative, ignoring, or at the very least
52. The district court found the Yates Field $2.8 billion option price to be reasona-





56. Id. at 376.
57. Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); see also Note, Lock-up Options; Toward a State Law
Standard, 96 Harvard L. Rev. 1068, 1071 (1983); Note, supra note 2 at 650.
58. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476.
59. Id.
60. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199.
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brushing aside, the element of intent, previously stated as essential61
by the Supreme Court.
By ignoring such an important element of manipulation, the court
appears to circumvent both the Supreme Court's interpretation of
manipulation and the purpose of the Williams Act.62 The Mobil
court stated the Williams Act requires that U.S. Steel and all other
interested bidders be "permitted an equal opportunity to compete in
the marketplace" for Marathon shares.13 The Mobil court under-
stood the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act, as stated in
Santa Fe Industries v. Green, to mean that "mere allegations of un-
fairness and breach of fiduciary duty by majority shareholders to mi-
nority shareholders" do not violate section 14(e)." The court further
noted that nondisclosure is not the only ground on which to base a
section 14(e) claim, although it is "usually essential to the success of
a manipulative scheme." 65 Finally, the court stated that full disclos-
ure does not necessarily extinguish a claim based on manipulation.66
The Mobil court's understanding of the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation appears accurate if the scienter element is retained in the
analysis. Unfortunately, the court disregarded scienter, and went on
to find that, in spite of full disclosure,67 the claim of no breach of
fiduciary duty,68 and the statute's tangential concern for fairness,69
the options demanded by U.S. Steel were manipulative devices under
section 14(e) because they artificially affected market forces. Mobil
has created confusion over a term which previously had been clearly
defined by the Supreme Court.
The Mobil court emphasized the element of artificially affecting
the market forces.70 A careful reading of the court's opinion, how-
ever, reveals a constant thread of implied concern for fairness and/or
the fiduciary duties of the directors. The Mobil court stated that af-
ter full disclosure, the shareholders "may now understand fully how
these options deter any tender offers higher than $125 per share.
Yet, they have had no real alternative to accepting the [U.S. Steel]
61. The Mobil court may well have found U.S. Steel's demands on Marathon to
involve the intent to deceive. The court, however, never addressed the issue. This is the
basis for the court's error in analysis. Cf., 669 F.2d at 374.
62.' See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
63. 669 F.2d at 376. To the contrary, the Act does not urge equal opportunity to
make tender offers, but merely equal opportunity to fairly present their case. This is
achieved through full disclosure. 113 CONG. REC. 854, 855 (1967).
64. 669 F.2d at 376. Santa Fe states "once full and fair disclosure has occurred,
the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the stat-
ute." 430 U.S. at 478.
65. 669 F.2d at 376, citing Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477.
66. 669 F.2d at 376.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 374.
69. See supra note 64.
70. 669 F.2d at 375.
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offer . ".71
If the Marathon directors were not breaching their fiduciary duty
and if the Williams Act, for the most part, does not look to fairness
of the terms,72 why is the Mobil court trying to get what they per-
ceive as the best deal for the shareholders? The court appears to
assume that shareholders have an absolute right to consider all
tender offers, or potential tender offers, whether or not the directors
think the corporation's best interest would be served. 3 The Mobil
court apparently believed it faced a dilemma: should the target cor-
poration to be able to undertake any tender offer defenses so long as
there is full disclosure, or alternatively to recognize that the share-
holders have an absolute right to consider all tender offers thus pre-
cluding management from taking action against any tender offers
even if such tender offers are clearly not in the best interest of the
corporation. Mobil apparently expanded the judicial construction of
manipulation to solve this dilemma. In the process, however, the Mo-
bil court appears to have extended the Williams Act beyond its in-
tended purpose.
Impact of Mobil on Takeover Defenses
The Mobil decision speaks to competing bidders, yet will affect
the tactical choices of the target. The expansive interpretation the
Mobil court has given to "manipulation" may seriously prevent tar-
get management from using any effective defense against any tender
offer. If indeed any potential defense by a target is prevented, Mobil
circumvents the purpose of neutrality engrained in the Williams
Act.7 4 The Act was never intended to eliminate the defenses used by
target management; rather, the purpose is to ensure full disclosure
and to allow equal opportunity to both target and bidder to present
their cases to shareholders.
In presenting their cases, target and bidder must not intentionally
deceive or mislead investors by using devices which artificially affect
market forces. Mobil goes beyond this by eliminating the potential
use of any devices which artificially affect the market, ignoring the
scienter element.
To illustrate, some of target management's most popular defensive
71. Id. at 376-77.
72. See supra note 64.
73. Panter, Matyas & Panter, Why Shareholders Have the Right to Accept
Tender Offers, 61 Cm. BAR REC. 368 (May/June 1980).
74. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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devices, previously considered not manipulative, may, after Mobil,
be considered manipulative. Devices such as lock-ups, repurchasing
of shares by the target, or target acquisitions creating anti-trust
complications for the bidder, may be manipulative devices under a
Mobil interpretation.
The lock-up device 5 has been used with increasing frequency by
target managements to defend against hostile takeovers. The Mobil
court reviewed the lock-up defense and found it manipulative and
violative of section 14(e). Under the Supreme Court interpretation of
manipulation, the lock-up defense would not be in violation of sec-
tion 14(e) so long as full disclosure occurred and no intent to deceive
was present.
Another defense used by target corporations is to repurchase their
own shares. 6 Several purposes may be sought by this defense. First,
the target may wish to increase the percentage of shares held by a
control group, which it knows to be friendly, to a point which would
defeat the hostile bidder.77 Second, the target may thwart the hostile
bid by increasing the price of the shares, causing the bidder to raise
its bid beyond that which it is willing or able to pay.7 8 Third, the
target may buy up shares from a "weak" or dissident block of share-
holders who may have been persuaded to tender their shares rather
easily.79 Finally, the target may settle with the hostile bidder by of-
fering to repurchase the bidder's outstanding target shares, usually
at a large profit to the bidder.80
The target's repurchase of shares, according to Mobil, may fall
within the definition of manipulation. Enhancing the strength of an
existing control group to deter tender offers would artificially affect
market forces and would therefore be manipulative according to the
court.81 A large percentage of shares held by a control group would
effectively decrease the demand for takeover by bidders. Thus, a bid-
der may be willing to offer a premium over the market price, but will
decide against the offer because of the futility of gaining control
75. A "lock up" typically involves the sale of, or grant of, an option to purchase
stock or capital assets of the target corporation to the white knight (preferred suitor)
tender offeror and is intended to give the preferred suitor a substantial competitive ad-
vantage over other potential acquires. Nathan, Lock-ups and Leg-ups: The Search for
Security in the Acquisitions Marketplace, 13 ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 13, 69-70
(1981).
76. Stock repurchases may also be used as a mere business decision or as a preven-
tive measure to takeovers. Nathan & Sobel, Corporate Stock Repurchases in the Con-
text of Unsolicited Takeover Bids, 35 Bus. LAW. 1545 (1980). This Comment will focus
solely on stock repurchases used as a defense to imminent or pending hostile takeovers.




81. Mobil, 669 F.2d at 374.
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from the control group. The repurchase could very easily be seen as
artificially driving demand for a takeover downward.
Repurchasing shares to increase the price beyond that which the
hostile bidder is willing or able to pay8 2 may also be manipulative.
Again, the target will be creating a false demand in the market by
repurchasing shares, reflected by the increase in market price. This
type of defense might well fall within both the Supreme Court's defi-
nition of manipulation (i.e., an intent to mislead or deceive inves-
tors8 3) and the Mobil definition.
Repurchasing shares from a dissident or weak block of sharehold-
ers is a purely negative defense. By itself, the repurchase will not
defeat a hostile tender offer, it will merely make the first step of
acquisition that much more difficult."s The artificial effect is not as
clear with this defense, although neither is the actual use of such a
weak defense to fight tender offers. Any finding of manipulation
from artificially affecting market forces would again come from
falsely affecting demand upward. However, such a finding would be
less likely as a result in this tender defense.
Settling with the bidder by offering to purchase the already ac-
quired shares at a handsome profit to the bidder, artificially affects
the market forces by removing demand which the target deems hos-
tile. By removing hostile demand, the target has artificially de-
creased total demand through payoffs. The decrease in demand
would then result in an artificial decrease in the price. The payoffs
might well be considered artificial and therefore manipulative under
Mobil.
Finally, the target may thwart a hostile takeover by seeking a de-
fensive acquisition of a company for the purpose of erecting an anti-
trust obstacle to the bidder.8 5 A subsequent takeover by the bidder
might result in anticompetitive or monopolistic violations of the
Clayton Act.86 The bidder, however, may dispose of the antitrust al-
82. The target must, however, be aware that the bidder may have a much stronger
financial capacity. The target must also comply with any debt/equity ratio requirements.
Nathan & Sobel, supra note 76, at 1558.
83. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. If the target intends to raise the
price of shares by the repurchase, then the act may well fall within the Supreme Court's
definition of manipulation.
84. Nathan & Sobel, supra note 76, at 1563. The repurchase may be a "pyrrhic
victory" since it may ultimately save the hostile bidder money.
85. Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 901, 936-38 (1979).
86. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits the takeover of one corporation by an-
other if that takeover would tend to cause a monopoly or substantially lessen competition.
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legation by agreeing to divest itself of the competing line of business
once the takeover is complete.8 7
The antitrust acquisition by the target may also be prohibited
under Mobil's definition of manipulation. The target, through the
acquisition, would artificially affect the market forces by eradicating
demand from, theoretically, an entire industry, i.e., that industry
which would be precluded from takeover by the Clayton Act.88
Consequently, the effect of Mobil on tender offer defenses such as
lock-ups, repurchasing of shares, and antitrust acquisitions may be
disastrous. Mobil potentially possesses broad implications which
would ultimately leave a target corporation defenseless when con-
fronted with a hostile tender offer. The Williams Act was carefully
drafted to evince a role of neutrality between a bidder and target. 89
The Mobil interpretation would circumvent this purpose of neutral-
ity by leaving the target defenseless.
The Williams Act was passed when defenses to tender offers by
target corporations were known to the drafters. Nevertheless, the
Act does not explicitly limit or restrict any defensive maneuvers a
target may take; rather, the goal of neutrality is expounded. The
legislature, urging neutrality, does not wish to leave the target de-
fenseless, as Mobil would, but wishes to allow both bidder and target
to present equally their cases to the shareholders. If the target de-
fends against the takeover, the shareholders must rely on their direc-
tors' proper business judgment"0 that the takeover was not in their
best interest. By removing the target defenses, the court forces
shareholders to rely solely on conflicting disclosures of both the tar-
get and the bidder, both usually very persuasive. The average share-
holder may rely on the target management's assessment that the
takeover is not in the best interest of the corporation. On the other
hand, the "smell" of money from the bidder may interfere with the
shareholders' rational business decision-making process.
To be sure, money currently tendered is a main factor in making a
business decision; however, with the biased view of the bidder, the
tendering of shares may not be in the best interest of the corporation
and the shareholders, especially in light of the target's resistance. As
a result, the Mobil interpretation of manipulation would leave the
target defenseless in the face of hostile tender offers creating a
strong possibility that the best long-term interests of the corporation
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
87. See F.T.C. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977).
88. The target must also be aware of breaching any fiduciary duty, as well as
scienter under section 14(e), when acquiring a company solely for the purpose of creating
antitrust complications for a hostile bidder.
89. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 96 and 98 and accompanying text.
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and shareholders would be damaged.
Conflict of Interest Considered in Mobil Decision
The possibility that the best interests of the shareholders would be
in jeopardy also arises when target management defends against a
hostile tender offer. When a hostile takeover occurs, there is a strong
liklihood the incumbent directors will lose their positions.9 1 Conse-
quently, target directors desire to defend against the hostile takeover
to retain their jobs. The director's duty is to act in the shareholders'
best interest and not in his own best interest. The defense of a hostile
tender offer, however, creates a conflict of interest between the inter-
ests of the shareholders and those of the director.
The Mobil court was confronted with the dilemma of whether to
allow shareholders the absolute right to consider a tender offer or to
allow the target directors to use any defense against a tender offer
(realizing the target directors' conflict of interest) if full disclosure
was present and intent to deceive was absent. The Mobil court, al-
though never expressly stating it, seemed concerned with the conflict
of interest and the potential damage to shareholders. The court
seemed to recognize the problem, yet dealt with it in a manner
which strained the statutory language. Mobil tortured the meaning
of manipulation under section 14(e) to protect shareholders and si-
multaneously eliminated the inherent conflict of interest.
This conflict of interest is not addressed by section 14(e) (although
Mobil tried its best to make section 14(e) address it), but is gener-
ally governed by the business judgment rule92 followed under most
states' law.93 The business judgment rule retains a strong presump-
tion that corporate directors have acted in good faith, and protects
directors' decisions so long as a valid business purpose underlies
those decisions.94 The heavy burden to overcome the business judg-
ment rule renders the rule virtually powerless to combat the conflict
of interest inherent in defenses to tender offers.95
The unique problem of a conflict of interest inherent in tender of-
91. The hostile bidder will more than likely replace the old directors with its own.
92. E.g., Berman v. Gerber Prod. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (W.D. Mich.
1978). For a discussion of the business judgment rule and tender offers see Prentice,
Target Board Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can Federal Laws Be Mobilized to Overcome
the Business Judgment Rule? 8 J. CORP. L. 337, 345-46 (1983).
93. Prentice, supra note 92, at 345 n.57.
94. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
95. See Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Of-
fers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 915-16 (1979).
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fer defenses is not adequately dealt with by the state's business judg-
ment rule and requires federal legislation to resolve the problem. The
main concern of this conflict of interest is shareholder protection
which is also one of the main concerns of the Williams Act.96 An
amendment to the Williams Act authorizing the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) to formulate rules dealing specifically with
tender offer defenses and the inherent conflict of interest would pro-
mote shareholder protection and counteract the conflict of interest.
The SEC should take care to initiate rules consistent with the fed-
eral scheme of the Williams Act-shareholder protection and neu-
trality between the target and bidder corporation through full and
fair disclosure.97 The amendment, however, should allow the SEC a
certain amount of flexibility due to the uniqueness of the problem.
The SEC must be able to formulate requirements that insure, to the
greatest degree possible, that the defensive actions of the directors
are in the best interest of the shareholders. The requirements, how-
ever, must not go so far as to fully usurp the directors' business dis-
cretion or to unduly burden the target's defensive tactics.
Keeping these factors in mind, the SEC rule should require the
target corporation to file with the SEC a business purpose, which is
in the best interest of the shareholders, for defending against a
tender offer. To insure that the directors have not merely fabricated
this business purpose, sufficient information substantiating their
claim must be submitted. This information may consist of either the
detrimental effects the hostile bidder may have on the target or the
greater beneficial effects of the defensive action or both.
This requirement is consistent with the Williams Act's purpose of
shareholder protection and neutrality between the target and bidder
through full and fair disclosure. The filing requirement will protect
the shareholders by informing them of why their directors are de-
fending against the takeover. In effect, the shareholders will not have
to sit back and watch as the directors fight the tender offer, but in-
stead will be informed as to the underlying goals of the directors.
This will enable the shareholders to better scrutinize the actions of
their directors and will also provide an action for fraud against the
directors if the shareholders can prove the directors lied.
Neutrality will also not be unduly interfered with by this filing
requirement. The filing does not place any more of a burden on the
target than any other federal securities regulation which requires in-
formational filings.98 The filing is one more step in insuring full and
fair disclosure while simultaneously combating the conflict of
96. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
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interest.
This rule does not, nor does any other rule which allows target
directors to defend a hostile takeover, totally extinguish the conflict
of interest. It does, however, confront the problem and alleviate it to
a much greater degree than either the business judgment rule or sec-
tion 14(e). The rule is also a much better remedy for the conflict of
interest than the strained interpretation Mobil bestowed on the term
manipulation.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the Williams Act as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, is one of shareholder protection and of regulatory neutrality
between the target and bidder. The Act furthers full and fair disclos-
ure by allowing the target and bidder to present their cases equally.
Section 14(e) of the Act prohibits manipulative acts concerning
any tender offer. The Supreme Court has recognized that manipula-
tion when used with securities is a term of art, and requires the in-
tent to mislead investors by artificially affecting the market. The
Mobil decision drastically deviates from the Supreme Court's re-
quirement of intent.
Although Mobil misreads or disregards the requirements for a
claim of manipulation, the court recognized the inherent conflict of
interests for target management when defending against takeovers.
Unfortunately, the court strains the language of section 14(e) at-
tempting to resolve this conflict of interest. Section 14(e) was not
meant to resolve this problem.
The business judgment rule, with its strong presumption of good
faith on the part of the directors, is also inadequate to address the
conflict of interest inherent in tender offer defenses. The presumption
is an almost insurmountable barrier to any challenge of a director's
business judgment.
The inadequacy of both the business judgment rule and section
14(e) requires that federal legislation specifically dealing with this
conflict of interest be passed. The legislation should require the tar-
get directors to file with the SEC their purpose, along with sufficient
information backing this purpose, for defending against a tender of-
fer. This avoids the barriers of the business judgment rule, while still
allowing target directors immunity for valid business judgments, all
in the best interest of the shareholders.
TIMOTHY N. WILL
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